YOSHIMOTO Hideko

This study aims to examine the public diplomatic policies of the United States toward Okinawa, Japan, during President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration through the lens of his strategy of waging psychological warfare as an inexpensive tool to fight the Cold War. Much research has been expended on the role civilian agencies such as the Department of State played in the U.S. administration of military bases in Okinawa; however, this research focuses on how the Department of Defense, in a rare move, coordinated with civilian agencies to counter anti-U.S. sentiment in Okinawa. Formally institutionalized and militarized at the Executive Office of the President under the National Security Council in coordination with the Pentagon, the U.S. Okinawa policy proved to be a blueprint of public diplomacy and psychological warfare later used for the postwar disposition of conflict areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This study increases understanding of how the U.S. formulates shifting foreign policy aimed toward gaining not only external military control of foreign regions but also the minds of the local populace. Previous studies have pointed to the Eisenhower administration as transforming the president’s organizational apparatus to implement “the war of language.” This case study presents how the Eisenhower administration strengthened the power of the rhetorical presidency through its decisionmaking process with regard to U.S.-occupied Okinawa.