

# The United States' Public Diplomacy and Psychological Warfare under the Jurisdiction of the Pentagon: Coordinating the Okinawa Policy at Eisenhower's Executive Office

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## Abstract

This study aims to examine the public diplomatic policies of the United States toward Okinawa, Japan, during President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration through the lens of his strategy of waging psychological warfare as an inexpensive tool to fight the Cold War. Much research has been expended on the role civilian agencies such as the Department of State played in the U.S. administration of military bases in Okinawa; however, this research focuses on how the Department of Defense, in a rare move, coordinated with civilian agencies to counter anti-U.S. sentiment in Okinawa. Formally institutionalized and militarized at the Executive Office of the President under the National Security Council in coordination with the Pentagon, the U.S. Okinawa policy proved to be a blueprint of public diplomacy and psychological warfare later used for the postwar disposition of conflict areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This study increases understanding of how the U.S. formulates shifting foreign policy aimed toward gaining not only external military control of foreign regions but also the minds of the local populace. Previous studies have pointed to the Eisenhower administration as transforming the president's organizational apparatus to implement "the war of language." This case study presents how the Eisenhower administration strengthened the power of the rhetorical presidency through its decision-making process with regard to U.S.-occupied Okinawa.

**Keywords:** Public Diplomacy, Rhetorical Presidency, Eisenhower, Okinawa, Operations Coordinating Board

## Introduction

The U.S. strategically engaged in public diplomacy during the Cold War. Metzgar<sup>1</sup> defined public diplomacy as "public relations for countries with special emphasis for influencing foreign audiences." However, in the 1950s, U.S. public relations for foreign audiences were regarded as "psychological warfare," a term stemming from the U.S. military program during World War II.<sup>2</sup> Pledging to the fight against Communists, President Dwight D. Eisenhower empowered the federal information machinery to reach foreign audiences in the first year of his administration. In August 1953, Eisenhower established the United States Information Agency (hereafter, USIA), which succeeded international broadcasting media such as the Voice of America in the Department of State. Recent studies have reconceived the Cold War as an "information war" and determined the policy-making processes of the U.S. to be public diplomacy.<sup>3</sup> Due to the declassification of public documents from the Cold War, past studies have focused on the role of civilian agencies such as the Department of State and USIA.<sup>4</sup> However, Okinawa, the southernmost islands of Japan, was outside the purview of research since it had been under the administration of U.S. military commanders from 1945 to 1972. In the Peace Treaty with Japan signed at the San Francisco Peace Conference after World War II, Article 5 restored Japan's independence in April 1952, while allowing the U.S. an extended occupation of the islands. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff stationed on the islands, which they called the "keystone of the Pacific," directly controlled the military bases and daily

lives of the islanders.<sup>5</sup>

Okinawa was not under the Department of State in charge of U.S. diplomacy, but under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and military command. Since the disposition of the Japan Treaty, islands including Okinawa were defined as part of the U.S. country plan for Japan in the policy papers of the National Security Council (hereafter, NSC). The Okinawa policy had to be formulated through interdepartmental negotiation at the Executive Office of the President (hereafter, EOP) under the policies determined by the NSC. Therefore, this study aims to examine the policy-making processes of the EOP, focusing on the directions of the federal governments that determined the U.S. administration of Okinawa. Past studies dealing with U.S. – Japan relations and Okinawa have clarified that the interdepartmental negotiation processes between the Departments of State and Defense were critical to the decision-making process regarding the U.S. reversion of Okinawa to Japan.<sup>6</sup> During the Eisenhower administration, the Department of State had gradually expanded its position against the Department of Defense in the interdepartmental coordination at the NSC and Operations Coordinating Board (hereafter, OCB), established under the NSC by “Ike’s” (Eisenhower) WWII friends engaged in psychological warfare and later recruited by the Eisenhower administration.

Past studies have pointed out that the U.S. policy toward Okinawa was discussed not at the NSC, but mostly at the OCB.<sup>7</sup> However, there were no detailed discussions on 1) how the EOP positioned the interdepartmental negotiation regarding the U.S. policies toward Okinawa, and 2) why it was the OCB, a lower echelon under the NSC, and not the NSC itself, that discussed Okinawa policies. It is also not clear how the U.S. administrative organizations in Okinawa were related with EOP-level decision-making processes. Determining U.S. public diplomacy policy toward Okinawa, this study analyzes the unaddressed research questions as empirically as possible — how the NSC and OCB at Eisenhower’s Executive Office coordinated the interdepartmental policy toward Okinawa and how the OCB was related to the U.S. posts in Okinawa. Few studies have empirically evaluated the cultural aspects of the Cold War.<sup>8</sup>

Based on archival research material, this study argues that the U.S. policy toward Okinawa underwent a transformation under Eisenhower because his administration promoted public relations aimed at foreign audiences overseen by the Secretary of State and civilian agencies such as the USIA. The Department of Defense continued to control Okinawa during Eisenhower’s tenure as president, which was an exception for the EOP, as it was civilian agencies, and not the Department of Defense, that conducted U.S. public diplomacy toward regions such as Western Europe. This establishes the U.S. administrative policy toward Okinawa as an extended postwar occupation with a wartime legacy.<sup>9</sup> Throughout the analysis, it is shown that the Department of State, while in charge of public diplomacy, in fact explored avenues of psychological warfare of which the Department of Defense was in charge. Further, this process gradually expanded to the Japanese government in which the staffers were fluent in Japanese and rooted in the local culture, played a crucial role in the U.S. control of Okinawa. It was not the NSC but the OCB that elaborately coordinated and conducted such foreign information operations. As a civilian organization belonging to the EOP, insofar as the information policy was concerned, the OCB took charge of the Okinawa administrative policy around the U.S. military bases in Japan instead of the Department of the Army under the Secretary of Defense.

### **Fighting the Cold War with the “Mind”**

As a former general who traveled to North Africa with the joint psychological warfare unit of the army and navy during World War II, Eisenhower believed in and insisted on empowering the U.S. with foreign

information policy — an inexpensive and peaceful tool for the Cold War. In his October 1952 speech in San Francisco, at the final stage of his presidential campaign, he stressed the necessity of waging “psychological warfare” without the loss of American lives.<sup>10</sup> Abbott Washburn was the speech writer who bolstered Ike’s campaign. The public relations specialist supported Eisenhower’s administration and its foreign information activities as a deputy director of the USIA when the agency was formally launched by Executive Order 10483. Abolished in 1999 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the agency served as a directorate for U.S. public relations overseas, disseminating information policy guidelines through the United States Information Services and its foreign posts, while collecting various information and analyzing radio programs and messages from Communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China.

Washburn aided Eisenhower in establishing, with his friends, an apparatus in the EOP suitable for the new strategy of information warfare. With C. D. Jackson appointed as special assistant to the president, Washburn launched the President’s Committee for International Information Activities (PCIIA) that pushed for the empowerment of the EOP as the highest echelon of the federal government. Washburn and C. D. Jackson appointed “another Jackson,” William Jackson, who specialized in law and intelligence, as the chairman of the committee. The Jackson Committee, named after its chairman, strived to expand the authority of the EOP over other departments. Eisenhower’s aides believed that it was necessary to engage in information warfare effectively.<sup>11</sup>

The Psychological Strategy Board (hereafter, PSB), established during President Harry S. Truman’s administration, was the directorate for psychological warfare operations. It was, however, criticized for not functioning as a center of organizational coordination.<sup>12</sup> To cover up the weakness of its predecessor, the Jackson Committee discussed the necessity for strengthening presidential authority over existing departments and submitted a final report to the president on June 30, 1953, in which the committee recommended revamping the PSB into a much more powerful organization directly under the NSC. The OCB was established on the basis of the Jackson Committee report.<sup>13</sup> Given the role of evaluating the achievement level of U.S. national policy, the OCB prepared a series of progress reports for the NSC. As described later, the U.S. posts in Okinawa reported their activities related to public affairs to the OCB, and these were included in the OCB progress reports during Eisenhower’s term.

Eisenhower’s Executive Office strengthened the position of the Secretary of State with regard to foreign information policy. Although the Smith-Mundt Act, the principle law for U.S. public diplomacy, had determined that the Secretary of State should be responsible for interdepartmental coordination,<sup>14</sup> as described earlier, interdepartmental coordination was not in good shape among the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).<sup>15</sup> Thus, the Eisenhower administration needed to further empower the Secretary of State. Eisenhower’s EOP reaffirmed the principle whereby an ambassador dispatched from the Department of State was to hold a higher position than a theater commander from the Department of Defense or mission chief from the CIA. However, this policy was not applied to postwar Japan, specifically to Okinawa, where the U.S. theater commander was the topmost U.S. official even in peacetime. The NSC decided the Secretary of Defense would be responsible for the U.S. administration of Okinawa in an appendix to the policy papers. As a result, U.S. public diplomacy mandated the deployment of civilian agencies, such as the Department of State and USIA, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. It was the exception in U.S. policy worldwide.

### **Okinawa as an appendix to the Japan policy**

Treated as an exception in U.S. public diplomacy policy, Okinawan issues were placed as an “Appendix” to the NSC policy papers and under “Action” subordinate to the official NSC policy papers. Further

archival research is needed to determine why Okinawa was subordinated to the formal NSC archives. However, this may be related to the fact that though Okinawan policy was part of U.S. policy toward Japan, it was under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense handling the military, rather than the Department of State handling U.S. diplomacy. As the previous section described, the information policy toward Okinawa was categorized under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, while the policy toward Japan was under the Department of State. Therefore, the Eisenhower administration may have undermined Okinawan issues as unsuitable for NSC-level discussions and categorized them as an appendix to the formal foreign policy.

On June 25, 1953, at the 151st meeting of the NSC, it was decided that Okinawa would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense by issuing NSC Action 824-b as a subordinating decision to NSC 125 or "Policy Toward Japan." The U.S., through NSC Action 824-a, the decision paired with NSC Action 824-b, decided to return the Amami Islands to Japan in the near future. While NSC Action 824-a has been well researched in the past, the paired decision has not been mentioned in some studies.<sup>16</sup> The U.S. postwar occupation of Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands, as defined by Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan, was prolonged. However, NSC Action 824-b was an important decision determining that the Secretary of Defense would be responsible for the Japan Treaty Islands, including the Ryukyu Islands.<sup>17</sup> For peacetime U.S. foreign relations, ambassadors reporting to the Secretary of State are generally placed higher than theater commanders reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In Okinawa, however, NSC Action 824-b brought the Japan Treaty Islands within the folds of a wartime structure in which U.S. theater commander Matthew B. Ridgeway was to be in a higher position than the ambassador to Japan, Robert D. Murphy. Since the U.S. military bases in Okinawa were used for the war in Korea, on April 28, 1952, the NSC decided to continue upholding the wartime structure in Okinawa shortly before the cease-fire agreement on the Thirty-eighth Parallel dividing Korea into the North and South.<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, NSC Action 824-b required the Secretary of Defense to collaborate with other departments and agencies such as the Department of State and CIA. As a coordinating organization, it was essential for the NSC to direct interdepartmental coordination, but a turning point for the U.S. administration of Okinawa proved to be the EOP increasing its influence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff decreasing their authority. In November 1953, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson admitted the diplomatic role of the Department of State on the Japan Treaty Islands, which led the Secretary of State to increase his diplomatic role over the islands.<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, NSC Action 824-b expanded the authority of civilians in the Department of Defense over uniformed personnel, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This also aimed for "drastic reduction of the armaments," as Eisenhower promised in his inaugural address on January 20, 1953.<sup>20</sup> At the same time, he pledged to fight the Cold War in a nontraditional way rather than using traditional armaments. It was the principal policy of his administration that had dominated his electoral campaign.

### **Psychological Warfare in Japan Policy Papers**

This section discusses how the NSC positioned the Okinawa policy vis-à-vis the Japan policy and U.S. foreign information policy. The U.S. policies toward Japan have been elaborately examined in past studies, and the Eisenhower administration and NSC policy papers toward Japan have been studied.<sup>21</sup> However, the U.S. information policy toward Okinawa as well as Japan has not yet been closely studied, especially in relation to the NSC policy papers and the country plan for Japan.

The U.S. information policy toward Okinawa was described as psychological warfare in NSC 125: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan originally drafted during the

Truman administration. The Department of State preferred to use the term public diplomacy, as the Under Secretary of State traditionally dealt with public relations for the federal government. However, it was after the 1960s that the term “public diplomacy” became common and, in the 1950s, Eisenhower used the term psychological warfare in his addresses and speeches. The latter was frequently featured in World War II and was subsequently adopted for the Japan policy with the president’s aides using the term during his administration.

During Truman’s administration, psychological warfare was under the jurisdiction of the PSB, and the D-27 committee was in charge of the psychological warfare policy for Japan. It was PSB D-27 documents that determined the policy, though they are not yet declassified. On January 30, 1953, officials at the NSC meeting held soon after Eisenhower became president decided to inherit and leverage the predecessor’s policy of psychological warfare toward Japan. Specifically, the NSC members revised the NSC policy papers and issued NSC 126/6 in which 3-a(5) defined psychological warfare toward Japan as follows:

Combat neutralist, communist and anti-U.S. sentiment in Japan, particularly by immediate implementation of the “Psychological Strategy Plan for Japan (PSB-D27, January 30, 1953), which stresses efforts to influence the Japanese intellectual classes, support for anti-communist groups, support of those favoring speedy rearmament, and promotion of mutual understanding between Japan and other free Far Eastern nations.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, the psychological strategy was explicitly described as part of the U.S. policy toward Japan. In “combat[ing]” communists, the plan aimed to support Japanese intellectuals promoting rearmament of the Japanese Defense Force. As previous research has pointed out, Japan had begun rearmament of its recently disbanded military forces when it accepted unconditional surrender in 1945.<sup>23</sup> While the war-weary Japanese citizens did not prefer going back to the garrison state, the policy received U.S. support at the NSC level and was further reinforced by the implementation of the psychological strategy toward Japanese political leaders and intellectuals.

John M. Allison, U.S. ambassador to Japan from 1953 to 1957 during the first half of the Eisenhower administration, was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs as well as the chairman of Panel “D,” whose members discussed the psychological strategy for Japan in the previous administration.<sup>24</sup> Expecting Japanese rearmament, Allison prioritized stabilizing the conservative government rather than supporting rearmament, a move harshly criticized by opposition parties in Japan.<sup>25</sup> Behind the ambassador’s move was the NSC policy papers regarding the psychological plan for Japan. While demanding the strengthening of the Japanese Defense Force, as the representative from the Department of State for U.S. diplomacy, Allison was required to report the reaction of Japanese leaders and intellectuals, detecting the effect of the psychological strategy he had planned, thereby faithfully supporting U.S. national policy.

According to Edward P. Lilly, a psychological warfare specialist and staffer at the EOP, psychological warfare was placed as “a support” for national policy. Accordingly, the public documents regarding psychological warfare were generally ranked as an appendix to NSC policy papers.

Coincidentally, the policy papers regarding the U.S. administration of Okinawa are also archived as an attachment to the NSC 125 Japan policy series in the EOP staff papers. These policy papers might not enable the conclusion that Okinawa’s administration by the U.S. amounted to psychological warfare, but psychological operations were regarded as an important element for the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (hereafter, USCAR), which succeeded the United States Military

Government to govern Okinawa until the reversion of May 1972. The USCAR Directive defined the role of the U.S. and was placed in the EOP staff papers as a supplement to the NSC 125 policy papers. The USCAR office-use-only document further directed federal employees that the USCAR "supports" the U.S. military activities in the Ryukyu Islands. Psychological warfare toward Okinawans was no more than one of the activities supporting the USCAR.<sup>26</sup> However, it is possible to conclude that the USCAR Directive was informally placed as a supplement to the formal U.S. national policy toward Japan, because the USCAR was established as a supporting body for the formal U.S. military activities in the Far East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that the U.S. needed to hold on to not only the military bases in Okinawa but also administrative authority over the southernmost islands of Japan. With the Department of Defense's proposal, the EOP coordinated the information policy with civilian agencies, such as the Department of State, USIA, and CIA, which were primarily responsible for U.S. foreign information activities. Whereas NSC 824-b determined the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for the U.S. administration of Okinawa, the Department of Defense needed to cooperate with these civilian departments and agencies with the EOP playing the role of the interdepartmental coordinator.

### **The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB)**

As a lower echelon directly reporting to the NSC in the Eisenhower administration, the OCB coordinated and oversaw U.S. foreign information policy among the related federal departments and agencies. As the previous section of this paper discussed, the Jackson Committee determined that the OCB should be attached to the NSC, and periodically wrote progress reports evaluating NSC policy papers and achievements.

The OCB submitted the progress report regarding NSC 125/6 at a regular NSC meeting on October 28, 1954. Although Panel "D" documents are still classified, the progress report reads: "Vigorous information programs have been carried on to give the Japanese a better understanding of the United States and of world programs and to combat leftist and neutralist influences."<sup>27</sup> The reactions of the Japanese were reported as follows:

The Japanese government and people continue to desire the return of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to Japan, although public pressure of their return has declined somewhat, and return of Amami Oshima to Japan was an important source of good-will to the United States. Because of the crucial strategic importance of these islands, the United States must continue to impress upon the Japanese its intention to retain control over them pending the establishment of enduring conditions of peace and stability in the Far East.<sup>28</sup>

The report revealed the Japanese sentiment toward the return of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands or Ogasawara Islands and stressed on the necessity of the psychological strategy toward Japanese political leaders, editors, and other opinion-makers. Given this complex and emotionally fraught situation, the OCB report proposed to strengthen the existing psychological strategy program for Japan (PSB D-27). Specifically, the OCB evaluated the psychological policy in Annex "A," which dealt with the psychological aspect of the Japanese people in detail.<sup>29</sup> The OCB reported that Allison had been in-charge of the psychological operations in Japan and wrote recommendations to the OCB's progress report. The report also referred to the "violent reaction" or oversensitivity of the Japanese against atomic energy, implying that the Japanese reactions to nuclear weapons were concerned with psychological operations along similar lines. A subgroup under the OCB was in charge of public relations regarding the nuclear

peace public relations campaign.<sup>30</sup> Thus, the OCB observed the psychological warfare toward Japan to strategically avoid the surge in public opinion regarding the return of Okinawa to Japan. The progress report dealt with issues other than the psychological aspect of the U.S. policy toward Japan, but it can be concluded that the U.S. regarded most parts of its diplomacy toward Japan as psychological strategy in the 1950s.<sup>31</sup>

### **Department of State's Role in NSC 5516/1**

Based on the OCB evaluation report, the NSC proposed the next policy paper on March 29, 1955, which was NSC 5516: U.S. Policy toward Japan. The first revision of the policy papers was approved at the 224th meeting of the NSC on April 4 and issued as NSC 5516/1.<sup>32</sup> It marked a turning point in that the role of Department of State was explicitly defined in Paragraph 54,<sup>33</sup> advancing NSC Action 824-b. Paragraph 54, for the first time after the Japanese surrender, determined that the U.S. could consider the Japanese government's request regarding the return of the Japan Treaty Islands, Ryukyus, and Ogasawara, to maintain favorable diplomatic relations with Japan.

Based on Paragraph 54, on May 31, Secretary of State John Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson exchanged a memorandum in which the Department of State decided to dispatch a diplomat to be stationed in Naha, Okinawa, to report Okinawan problems to the U.S. ambassador to Japan stationed in Tokyo. Finally, the Department of State acquired a pathway from Washington to Okinawa through Tokyo and was officially authorized to take diplomatic responsibility for U.S. – Japan relations.<sup>34</sup>

After complicated interdepartmental negotiations, Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10713 in June 1957, which finally identified the president as responsible for the U.S. administration of Okinawa. In the same month, the USCAR launched a mass media research project in Okinawa in collaboration with the United States Information Service (USIS) Tokyo, a branch of the USIA Washington.<sup>35</sup> The USIA outsourced the research project to the Central Research Corporation through the USIS Tokyo, which was being housed in the U.S. Embassy. The Tokyo-based private company hired and trained local interviewers in Okinawa. The survey was conducted in Japanese; however, the USCAR did not disclose that the U.S. government sponsored the research, owing to anxiety over survey respondents being unwilling to answer the questions honestly. The USIA needed to use a private Japanese corporation familiar with the local language and culture. The Japanese government did not participate in the research project, but was passively acquainted with the U.S. sponsored survey.

After June 1957, the USCAR policy papers included the role of both the Departments of State and Defense and, at the same time, the USCAR stated it would receive USIA information guidelines and other materials, thereby strengthening its relationship with the civilian foreign information agency. Originally interested in psychological warfare, the Department of Defense admitted public relations were necessary for the Okinawan people, and that it needed to cooperate with the Department of State in charge of the nation's public diplomacy by flexibly using the radio, movies, magazines, and other mass media. With the transformation of the relationship between the two departments, the Department of State, officially responsible for diplomacy, gradually expanded its authority to the administration of Okinawa, which had been under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, specifically of uniformed staff. The status of the Department of State was defined as an advisory body assisting the Department of Defense. However, the USCAR policy papers determined that the Department of State was the liaison for negotiations with the Japanese government.

Past research has pointed out that the role of the Japanese government started to expand with regard to Okinawa during the Eisenhower administration, as Japan expanded her economic assistance

for the U.S. administrated islands. In fact, the Department of State favored the expansion of Japanese economic assistance to counter reductions in the U.S. federal budget throughout the late 1950s. However, the Department of Defense was afraid the Japanese government might expand its socio-political influence over the Okinawan people as it expanded its economic impact in the region. It is interesting to observe that the Department of Defense not only easily agreed to cooperate with the Department of State in terms of strengthening its public relations campaign but was also eager to collaborate with the Department of State. This offered the Department of State a great opportunity for expanding departmental authority against the Department of Defense. The Eisenhower administration's policy promoting the foreign information strategy firmly backed the move toward interdepartmental coordination. As a successor of the PSB, the OCB coordinated complicated interdepartmental negotiations to promote a positive image of the U.S. that reached foreign audiences.<sup>36</sup> Later, however, John F. Kennedy's administration would abolish the OCB, which characterized the Eisenhower presidency.

### **The OCB's Mission Okinawa**

According to the U.S. national archives that were recently declassified, the OCB received "semi-annual review" reports from "the machinery of the Operations Coordinating Board" stationed in Okinawa, and the OCB wrote progress reports and submitted them to the NSC. According to other documents, the Consulate General Naha continually reported the situational changes in Okinawa to the Department of State. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Far East, was a committee member of the OCB. He reported Okinawan situations to the OCB and Dulles. It is not certain what was being described as "the machinery of the OCB" in the recently declassified document, but it might have been a civilian organization, such as the Consulate General Naha or Department of Public Affairs, USCAR.

As of December 1956, when Kamejiro Senaga was elected Mayor of Naha City, the Office of Public Information had been established in the USCAR. In April 1957, the Research and Analysis Division started to periodically gather information locally and monitor the content of Okinawa mass media.<sup>37</sup> Later, the Division merged with the Department of Public Affairs, USCAR. Prior to 1957, no public affairs officers were stationed in Okinawa. However, they arrived at Naha and began developing public affairs programs based on USIA guidelines in 1957. This implied that the U.S. public relations policy had changed.

The Department of Public Affairs, USCAR, launched public relations activities toward Okinawan mass media and the residents and played the role of liaison to the American embassy in Japan located in Tokyo. While receiving guidelines from the USIA Washington, the Department of Public Affairs engaged in several opinion-based research projects with the USIS Tokyo and research through mass media. Although the USCAR was under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, the Department of Public Affairs maintained relations with civilian information agencies. Thus, public affairs activities gradually expanded during Eisenhower's administration, while Congress undercut the defense budget for the U.S. administration of Okinawa.

Robertson, at the Department of State, was concerned about the political impact of the election of Naha Mayor Kamejiro Senaga, who was popular among the Okinawan people. The USCAR had carefully monitored mass media content and public opinion against the U.S. Specifically, the USCAR was anxious about the establishment of an anti-U.S. regime and branded Senaga's political activities as a "dangerous element" for the U.S. administration in Okinawa. The USCAR went on to freeze the bank account of Naha City through the Bank of Ryukyus that had been established by the U.S. government. On November 24, 1957, the USCAR revised Proclamation No. 2 of the Municipal Organization Ordinance and ousted Senaga



from office. However, on January 12, 1958, Saichi Kaneshi, Senaga's political successor, won the election and became mayor of the capital city of the Ryukyus. Therefore, criticism against the U.S. administration never ended.<sup>38</sup>

Given this situation, Robertson proposed the reorganization of the administrative body of the USCAR and consulted Dulles on the fact that the U.S. might have to request the Japanese government for assistance in taming criticism.<sup>39</sup> The Department of State, as well as Dulles and Robertson, attempted to improve the political situation in Okinawa to support the national goal of the Department of Defense. Previous studies have pointed out that the Department of State criticized the Department of Defense despite their cooperation with each other in advancing U.S. policy.

Another document recently declassified implies that the Department of State engaged in foreign information campaigns for the Okinawan people through "the machinery of the Operations Coordinating Board." For instance, on December 17, 1957, Chief Minister to Japan Richard H. Lamb wrote to Mr. James V. Martin, Jr., Far East Office, Department of State, that the Ryukyu Islands have strategic importance for the United States.<sup>40</sup> Lamb continues by writing that the U.S. planned to develop "adult political education" for the Okinawan people. However, the letter does not mention the details of the education program. Further, it is a known fact that the United States conducted a re-education campaign for the Japanese, a flagship program of the postwar occupation. A similar information and education program was conducted in Okinawa, especially to maintain favorable conditions for U.S. administration by supervising the local electorate.

After 1957, the USCAR began to show respect toward local cultural values and, in fact, started to empower locals through cultural exchange programs between the United States and the Ryukyus, which the Department of State highlighted throughout the Cold War. From 1957 to 1958, the Department of Public Affairs launched a series of public relations campaigns including the launch of "Ryukyu Today" or "Konnichi no Ryukyu," a Japanese language monthly magazine. Further, Japanese language pamphlets and posters were published. Perhaps the USCAR public relations officers finally came to realize that the Japanese language must be used for maximum effect of campaigns based on results of research conducted through mass media. Moreover, the Okinawan people did not read English. Eisenhower's foreign policy focused on the need to use public relations professionals familiar with the local language, as mass communications essentially depend on language and culture.<sup>41</sup>

In February 1958, the Department of State submitted a document to the OCB in which the State proposed that the federal budget for the USCAR administration would not be necessary. The document reads that the State, however, would support the economic assistance of the Japanese government for Okinawa.<sup>42</sup> The High Commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands, James Moore, who was the top official at the USCAR, did not agree with the State's proposal as Japanese economic assistance would strengthen Japanese influence over the Okinawan people. However, the Department of State gradually expanded its influence at the OCB. That resulted in the ambassador to Japan expanding his influence over the administration of Okinawa, which was under the Department of Defense.

Land problems marked a turning point in 1958. Tsumichiyo Asato and other Okinawan leaders visited Washington, D. C., and directly requested a solution from the Pentagon. The Okinawa visitors met Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansfield D. Sprague and petitioned regarding the poverty of Okinawan farmers. Although the Okinawan group had high expectations for change, Sprague's aim was to lend an ear to the Okinawan public. Therefore, in 1960, Sprague chaired the commission investigating the Eisenhower administration's foreign information policy which resulted in the Sprague Committee Report on the U.S. international radio services of the 1950s.<sup>43</sup> The Sprague Committee Report and Sprague's letters

were included in the OCB documents.<sup>44</sup> The U.S. needed to persuade the Okinawan people to maintain its administrative authority over the islands, while Sprague needed to know the Okinawan leaders and their opinions to coordinate foreign public relations, policies, and operations. He joined the OCB to coordinate public relations policies and operations with the Department of State, USIA, and other agencies.

Robertson's letter recommended using Japanese government assistance for U.S. administration of Okinawa, insisting that the Japanese government and private corporations knew the Okinawan people better than U.S. professionals. Robertson and the Department of State had expanded their influence based on Paragraph 54, which determined the role of the Department of State. As the Department of State needed the Japanese government's help for its public relations projects, Japan was provided an opportunity to expand its influence over Okinawa. In other words, U.S. – Japan relations finally acquired diplomatic status and character for the first time since the Japanese surrender. Though diplomatic relations finally commenced during the Eisenhower administration, public relations toward Okinawa continued to be conducted under the jurisdiction of the Pentagon. This was not an ordinary style bolstered with a hint of wartime psychological operations, but an exception for U.S. public diplomacy. Public relations officers literally supervised freedom of speech for the local people and mass media.

## **Conclusion**

Throughout the Cold War, civilian agencies such as the Department of State and USIA were responsible for U.S. public diplomacy, as the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 determined that the Secretary of State should be responsible for public relations with foreign audiences. However, Okinawa was an exception to the general rule defined in U.S. domestic law, because the legacy of the military occupation of Okinawa was carried forward after World War II. As a result, the tradition of psychological warfare reined over the U.S. administration of Okinawa, including its media policy. The Eisenhower presidency marked a turning point for U.S. foreign information policy toward Japan, especially Okinawa, as this administration eagerly promoted international media strategy and control. Although the U.S. promotes freedom of speech both domestically and diplomatically, the nation's foreign policy has often adversely affected freedom of the press and speech for foreign audiences in targeted regions.

As was examined in this study, Okinawa was under the jurisdiction of the Pentagon. Therefore, the U.S. administrative body or the USCAR was under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State in charge of U.S. public diplomacy in general supported the Defense project through the Japanese Embassy in Tokyo, which was primarily under the jurisdiction of the Department of State after Japan regained its independence in 1952. Eisenhower's EOP attempted to formalize the ambassador's authority over other federal agencies, such as the military offices and other missions stationed throughout the Japanese archipelago, while passively admitting that Okinawa was an exception. However, as Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10713 in 1957, the USIA launched a mass media research project in collaboration with the USCAR. Based on a social-scientific research project, professionals engaged in collecting information on civilians began to cooperate with military officers at the local level. The NSC decided the U.S. policy toward Japan and the OCB attached to the NSC would coordinate active programs for the U.S. administration of Okinawa. The machinery of the OCB reported Okinawan situations and problems to the Department of State, and the OCB coordinated with the Department of Defense and other federal agencies. As the OCB coordination began at the EOP, the Department of State's authority expanded, as did the role of the Japanese government.

U.S. public diplomacy under the jurisdiction of the Pentagon was derived from the special circumstance of Okinawa, as the islands were occupied under military commanders in the final stage of World War

II. The case of the U.S. administration of Okinawa later became a prototype for U.S. postwar disposition after recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the Department of State was responsible for public diplomacy during the Cold War, the military public diplomacy emerged as an important mission for the U.S. Army and other military posts.<sup>45</sup> In this sense, Okinawa's case should be carefully analyzed. While the Allied occupation of Japan is generally positively evaluated, the same cannot be said about Okinawa. During the presidential campaign year, Eisenhower proclaimed the U.S. would launch a war of language in peace, reducing the U.S. military budget. However, the war of language may have had a long-term, and much more serious psychological impact on the Japanese including Okinawans. Probably because the Japanese government had gotten used to the foreign military bases around the Japanese archipelago, it quietly allowed the establishment of foreign military bases across Japan. This mentality itself might be a reflection of the impact of U.S. public diplomacy under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

While the public diplomacy policy promoted cultural and educational exchanges, the information strategy contained a postcolonial tendency of the U.S. to disturb grassroots movements, agitating for the return of Japan, and blocking the right of self-determination. Although past research had pointed out the postcolonial tendency of the U.S. administration of Okinawa, it had not addressed the cultural aspect in relation to the U.S. national policy and country plan for Japan. Through an examination of the U.S. national archives, this study determined that it was a conscious decision for the Eisenhower administration to coordinate the U.S. information policy toward Okinawa as an integral part of the U.S. Cold War strategies. The tragedy of Cold War history, Odd Arne Westad said, was that "two historical projects that were genuinely anticolonial in their origins became part of a much older pattern of domination." The two historical projects refer to the U.S. as the leader of the liberal camp and the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist camp attempting to expand their power. Behind the Cold War power game and ideological conflicts, Westad pointed out, the two superpowers dragged in the old-fashioned colonialist mentality of domination over subordinate nations.<sup>46</sup> His comment was with regard to the Third World during the Cold War, but it also perfectly fits the case of Okinawa.

The Eisenhower administration not only institutionalized but also militarized U.S. foreign information policy apparatuses at the EOP for the purposes of implementing a war of language during the Cold War. While over-releasing peaceful propaganda from the USIA, the administration covertly institutionalized the president's office apparatus for information programs toward foreign lands, including Okinawa. The OCB was directly attached to and under the NSC, which Shawn J. Parry-Giles described as "the first and last official peacetime psychological warfare agency," as the Kennedy administration abolished the OCB immediately after the inauguration.<sup>47</sup> Previous studies have pointed to the role of the OCB as being essential for U.S. policy toward Okinawa, but have not identified the decision-making processes of Eisenhower's administration and the EOP. Based on declassified documents from the U.S. national archives, this study empirically analyzed how that administration institutionalized the policy-making process toward Okinawa. While the USIA, as an official mouthpiece for the U.S. government, continued to advocate for the news to be based on facts, the U.S. information programs toward U.S.-occupied Okinawa went covert under the jurisdiction of the Pentagon, at the direction of the OCB directly attached to Eisenhower's EOP.

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