

Value Orientation of Russian Youth in the Post-Soviet Era

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論文要旨

ソビエト体制崩壊後の新生ロシア社会は、大混乱の中でネオリベラリズムの思想に基づく経済政策、社会制策、教育政策を断行してきた。これらが、人々の生き方や価値志向にどのような影響をもたらしてきたのか。本論文の主要な目的は、ロシアの青年の価値志向に焦点を当て、大人世代の価値志向やソビエト期の青年のそれとの比較を通して、現代ロシア青年の価値志向の特徴及びその変化の一面を明らかにすることにある。

価値志向の研究はロシアの社会学者の中心的課題のひとつであるが、本論文では、彼らの研究成果を手がかりに、またわれわれが実施した調査をも加味して、以下の点を明らかにすることができた。①基本的な価値である健康や家族や友人への志向は、現代の青年もソビエト期の青年も価値志向の最上位を占めている。②ソビエト期の青年と比較すると、今日の青年は、労働の社会的価値よりも物的財産の取得への憧れが極端に強い。また、彼らは国家的、社会的課題への関心が著しく低い。③青年世代も成人世代は価値観が多様化し、国家としての連帯が求められている。特に成人世代には、政治不信から過去への復帰を期待する者も多い。④青少年の非行や犯罪の増大、また拝金主義の横行などから、1990年代の末以降、彼らの職業志向や価値志向の形成過程への規制の動きが現れてきた。しかし、その内容や方法や方向についての決定打は、現時点においても存在しない。

Key Words : value orientation, neoliberalism, delinquency, civic spirit, moral education

Introduction

With the social breakdown of the USSR in December of 1991, the new Russian Federation was born, and since then, it has seen revolutionary change in society and economics, moving from a socialist to a capitalist system with such speed that it has had an enormous impact on both the young people and adults who lived through that period as well as the children born from the latter half of perestroika to the first half on the 1990s. The education which they received, both at home and at school, and the influence of the mass media had on these young people's way of life and their value orientation, and this influence continues even today.

What are the values in today's society that these young people live by? Having an understanding of the value orientation of the young generation gives an indication of how well these young people are adapting to society, as well as serving as a barometer of the future society as a whole. As in most countries, national social policy makers as well as sociologists are highly interested in the value orientations of the youth. In Russia, the study of the value orientation of youth is one of the central research areas of

sociology, and research has continued from the base developed in the Soviet period. In Japan, there is a great deal of research done regarding the economic and political changes occurring in Russia, however there is none regarding the values orientation and the way in which this orientation develops in the Russian youth of today.

Specifically, we must look at the ways in which the value orientation of Russian youth has changed. With this in mind, the main goal of this paper is to spotlight the changes in the value orientation of the youth, and, using data from various surveys conducted both by Russian sociologists working on the national level as well as those conducted on a local level (including one which we conducted*), highlight the changes in value orientation in the post-Soviet era and search for solutions to the problems which have arisen. In our consideration of the changes in value orientation, we have also looked at research from the Soviet period as well.

In the consideration of the research on value orientation, we were unable to find any research which gave clear definition of the subject, thus we are using the definition provided by Konstantinovskii D. L. (1977)¹, the preference, inclination or needs regarding values which are

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formed by the interaction of subjective and objective factors in order to understand and further analyze our research. In addition, there is not a uniform age range on the research regarding youth—some research defines it as those between the ages of 14 and 28, while others regard youth as those under the age of thirty. For this paper, we are using the age range as defined by the Russian national surveys, which is between the ages of 14 and 30. For the 2002 National Survey, the youth constituted 27% of the total population.

In this paper, we will consider the issue in the following order.

1. Values and Value Orientation : Overview of the Concepts in Historical Context
2. Neoliberal Transformations and Subsequent Changes
3. The Economic Crisis of the 1990s: Juvenile Delinquency
4. The Born-in-reform Generation :Their Values and Choices
5. The Movement toward Social Regulation of Value Orientation of Russian Youth

Section 1 Values and Value Orientation: Overview of the Concepts in Historical Context

More and more, life values and value orientations have attracted the attention of Russian sociologists. Many articles and books have been published about the problems facing Russian youth regarding the development of their value systems. Studies on value orientations, on factors influencing their formation and the prevalence of different value systems in society are among the most important directions of sociology in Russia today. A Russian magazine, “Sociological Studies” has published a series of articles concerning value orientations of youth. However, a lot of studies are empirical (survey results without theoretical explanations, without definitions of terms) and this empirical material sometimes cannot be compared, due to the use of different methods of measurement.

Some modern Russian scientists use the theoretical ideas of Soviet sociology in their research. According to Yuldashev L. G. (2001)² and Toshenko Z. T. (1999)³, modern Russian theoretical sociology is in deep crisis and in need of its own “perestroika” (rebuilding).

In this report, for a solution to our theoretical and empirical issues, we will specify the terms “values” and “value orientation”, and will analyze the use of these terms

in Soviet history and modern Russian science.

Famous Soviet sociologists, Rutkevich M.N and Filippov F.I (1978)⁴, distinguished three terms: social orientation, professional orientation and value orientation. During the Soviet period, these terms were closely interwoven with a communist upbringing. At that time, educational institutions, Komsomol organizations and the Communist Party paid serious attention to professional orientation and vocational education to raise workers.

Professional orientation had a social aspect. During socialism, the professional structure of society had a deep connection with social structure. For example, the choice of a career as laborer meant entry into the working class, the choice of a university meant entry into intelligentsia. Therefore, this term could not be divided from social orientation.

According to Rutkevich (1978), social orientation meant orientation towards taking a definite place in the social structure of society. In a wider meaning, the social orientation of Soviet youth was related to the realization of core principles of their socialist society and socialist values and norms.

How do socio-professional orientations and life plans of youth connect? Orientation gives the aspirations of personality a general direction, and life plan forms on the basis of this orientation. Life plan means that a person formulates definite aims for some period and chooses definite means for their achievement.

Socio-professional orientation of youth has a deep connection with value orientation. During the Soviet period, the definition of value orientation as an orientation towards external things and values of life (value meant benefit, good, blessing) was spreading.

Yadov V.A. (1969)⁵ states that value orientation is a general direction which is fixed in the state of mind of an individual and is conditioned socially, it is a direction towards the aims and means of activity in some sphere.

In regards to this definition, Rutkevich (1978) argued that, first of all, it seemed to be incorrect that definition of value orientation included the totality of a person’s relations. Second, he said, that value orientations could not turn into the orientation of personality. A person borrows value orientations from a social group in the surrounding historical conditions. Third, he added that a system of values was a reflection of interests, and consequently a

reflection of socio-economic relations. Marxism explained ideological motives and value orientations as a reflection of conditions of material life and economic interests.

The orientation of youth, for example, toward entry into intelligentsia can have a deeper explanation if we understand the inner motivation of choice owing to the analysis of value orientations. Connection between the socio-professional orientation of youth and their value orientations can be found in the following: the main instruments of value orientations (towards material wealth, education as an opportunity to have better job, opportunity to use culture values, work with prospects of career and promotion and so on) have socially differentiated meanings. So, if a senior student has some preference towards certain values, it translates into choices of different ways of social advancement.

Of course, preference for some values can't always mean a direct social choice; at first, we can see that in some situations, life circumstances play a big role. Next, sociologists and psychologists noted the effect of the disconnection between value orientations and real actions in situations where the influence of life circumstances cannot be discerned. Then, preference for some values can occur within the bounds of a social orientation, for example one engineer prefers to develop cultural potential, another – family and children, and neither of them are thinking about social advancement.

During the Soviet era, the problem of forming socio-professional and value orientations in the consciousness of young people was a part of the problem of the Communist upbringing of youth.

In the last decade, several theoretic works about value theories have been published, so we can say that the overcoming of the crisis of Russian theoretical sociology has started. Two of the first social scientists to address the crises, Yuldashev L. G. (2001)⁶ and Branskiy V. P. (2000)⁷, state that values are the results or products of the various activities of people which satisfy the material and spiritual requirements of people of different social groups. These values are divided into utilitarian and spiritual. Utilitarian values satisfy material requirements. For example, economic values (goods) and politic values (laws). Spiritual values satisfy requirements in development spiritual world of people and form social feelings or knowledge. For example, esthetic values, scientific values, moral values and

others.

Sokolov A. V. and Sherbakova I. O. (2003)⁸ believe that value orientations connect with the requirements of a person. Requirements can be divided into biogenic, or 'conditioned by the nature of a human being', and socio-genic, or 'appearing as a result of the socio-cultural evolution of mankind'. Such requirements are said to be "primary" requirements. Secondary or instrumental requirements appear in the process of satisfying primary ones. Thus, value orientations conditioned by biogenic and socio-genic requirements, are 'terminal values', or 'values purposes'. Value orientations, conditioned by secondary requirements, are 'instrumental values' or 'values means'.

Value orientations are divided into normative and deviant. Normative value orientations connect with socio-genic requirements, so we can call them socio-cultural. Socio-genic requirements are separated into material and spiritual, so socio-cultural value orientations are differentiated in the same way.

Material orientations are orientations toward terminal values, such as health, family, material wealth: orientation toward maintenance of health, family planning, achievement of material wealth. Terminal spiritual values are different from material ones. Spiritual orientations are socialization (consisting of 4 components: professionalization, religiosity, political activity, patriotism), self-realization, cognitive orientations, communicative orientations, esthetic orientations, ethical orientations.

A great deal can be expected from the inroads made by Sokolov and other researchers into the theorization of value orientation research. However, there is still only a small amount of research that has been done in this area. The following is a consideration of the characteristics of the value orientation of youth in the Post-Soviet era as portrayed in recent experiential as well as experimental data results (including results from a research survey we ourselves have conducted in Kaluga city) regarding value orientation in youth and related subjects.

Section 2 Neoliberal Transformations and Subsequent Changes

Before analyzing value orientations of Russian youth we will describe factors that have influenced their

formation: reforms and the current social situation in Russia, the transformation of values in adults and their moral orientations, changes in the lifestyles of the Russian population and so on.

At the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, Russian society was plunged into “perestroika” and radical reform. Subsequently society felt the effects of moral deviations and the lack of moral orientation and values even more acutely than the economic and political changes. New liberal transformations coincided with the process of globalization. At the end of the 20th century, there were only a few pessimistic estimations in the press without attempts at scientific or critical understanding of social transformations. Attempts at critical understanding have only appeared recently. Discussions held in scientific circles reflected the rise of profound concern about the crisis in spiritual life.

According to Levashov V.K. (2004)⁹, morality is socially instituted and forms a special kind of social consciousness, regularizing individual and mass behavior with the aims of developing the human community based on the principals of co-evolution of human beings, society and nature. In every-day life, morality is the totality of customs (morals and manners) which reflect the moral health of society. Morality is the object of ethics and philosophical study. Between ethical principles, ideals and morals prevailing in society, there is always some unconformity. As a rule, unconformity becomes sharper during reforms.

The aim of all reforms is to improve QOL (quality of life). However, Russian statistics show that all social and economic indexes were becoming worse during the last decade of the 20th century.

The United Nations (UN) uses an index of development of human potential (IDHP) for international comparisons. This index reflects the level of achievements of different countries in 3 main aspects of development of human potential: long and healthy life (measured by the average life expectancy); knowledge (measured by level of adult literacy in the population and the percent of young people in school); and the economic level (measured by the gross domestic product [GDP]). So a country with maximum IDHP would have an average life expectancy of 85 years, 100% of its population should be educated, and a GDP of \$40,000. Norway occupies the top place in the

world according to this index. Russia is 63rd (2003). The average life expectancy in Russia is 64.8 (for the whole population), 58.5 for men and 72 for women (2002). The adult literacy rate is 99%, and the GDP per capita is \$6,742 (1996), compared to Japan’s \$23,980.

In Russia, 50 young people per 1000 (of population) are university students, while in Japan 31 young people per 1000 (of population) go to university (2000). The death rate (by murder and suicide) in Russia is 194 per 100,000, while in Japan it is 38 per 100,000 (“Statistics of Russia,” 2003)¹⁰.

The moral atmosphere in the society is formed by efforts of society and state in science, education, public health, the availability of work and adequate salary. One feature of modern Russia is that the moral climate is influenced by the social effectiveness of reforms. In other words, the influence comes from the dynamics of the percent of the population satisfied with these reforms. According to Levashov (2004)¹¹, the percent of the Russian population who had positive attitudes toward reforms was 11% in 1995 and 25% in 2003, the percent who had negative attitudes was 51% in 1995 and 34% in 2003. In 1995, 15% answered “it does not matter,” compared to 17% in 2003.

The social effectiveness of reforms depends on economic activity and the work motivation of population. Unfortunately, as the economic effectiveness of the Russian population was decreasing, the number of unemployed was growing.

Work underlies all moral-ethical systems. Payment rate defines the moral atmosphere in society. Work is one of the fundamental categories of moral-ethical systems. Discrimination in this area leads to the degradation of the moral system and the criminalization of social relations. Thus, when the average monthly salary fell below \$600, work seemed senseless. This led to a degeneration of the work culture, which was then replaced by organized crime.

According to “Otdel strategicheskikh sotsialnih sotsialno-politicheskikh issledovaniy” of Institut sotsialno-politicheskikh issledovaniy Rossiyskoy Akademii Nauk or ISPI RAN (2003)¹², 36% of respondents answered that the money they earned was enough only for buying food. Twelve percent answered that they did not have enough money to buy food. Thirty-nine percent said they had money to buy food and clothing; and only 11% could buy such things as TVs, refrigerators and so on.

Table 1 Population's opinion about providing basic moral and political norms of life (%)

Variations	1995		2000		2003	
	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
Equality before the law	11	85	7	91	11	89
Private security	4	91	3	96	6	94
Observance of human rights	12	83	4	94	10	90
Social guarantees	12	84	3	95	15	85
Freedom of political choice	59	35	37	52	58	42
Tolerance toward other people's views	35	58	15	53	39	61
Freedom of speech	52	42	35	58	57	43

(ISPI RAN, 2003)¹⁴

Such economic conditions caused a moral crisis in society which was expressed in the growth of alcoholism, drug addiction, prostitution and a higher death rate. For example, from 1996 to 2004 number of drug addicts grew five times.

The moral gap between society and the state led to a catastrophic depopulation. Reforms led to such social effects as the rising death rate and decreasing birth rate. The suicide rate grew 66%, while the murder rate rose 200%. The number of people with nervous (mental) disorders grew 2.7 times.

In summary, all of the statistics show that neoliberal transformations in Russia did not improve the quality of life or the social situation in the country.

After Mr.V. Putin became President of the Russian Federation in 2000, consolidation became the main policy of the state. Consolidation means the process of joining the society and state around common values and aims for effective actions. President Putin spoke about consolidation of all intellectual, political and moral resources. In other words, it meant the moral and political consolidation of society.

Does State power have resources to accomplish it? First, let's look at work motivation indicators. According to the research of ISPI RAN (2003)¹³, respondents were asked about life in Russia. In 1995, 15% of them answered that "everyone who works can be well provided for." In 2002, 30% gave that response and in 2003, 40%. So we can say that positive work motivation is improving. But 69% of respondents in 1995, 42% in 2002 and 39% in 2003 said that "no matter how much you work, you will never be well provided for." Nineteen percent of respondents said that

their quality of life had improved, while 43% answered that it "had become worse" and 27% said it "did not change."

The second indicator is the relationship between citizens and social-political institutions. Respondents were asked to decide whether they believed in their social and political institutions or not. In 1995, only 5% of respondents said they believed in the president, in 2003 that quantity grew to 57%. In 1995, only 6% answered that they believed in the banks, in 2003 it was 12%. However, not all indicators showed positive growth. In 1995, 16% of respondents said that they believed in the police, but in 2003 it dropped to 11%! Twenty-one percent answered that they believed in the mass media in 1995, while in 2003 it sagged to 17%! It was the same with other social and state institutions. Thus, we do not find a positive dynamic in relation to social and state institutions, except in the cases of the president and the banks.

The third indicator is based on the basic norms of life in a democratic society, shown in Table 1. When respondents were asked whether they felt private security (safety) was adequate, 94% answered "no" (2003). On questions about equality before the law, 89% answered "no."

Regarding observance of human rights, 90% said "no." However, regarding freedom of speech, 58% said "yes." Again, in total, we cannot say that the situation has improved.

In summary, the social-political situation is still in crisis, although there have been some positive changes in it. The moral and political consolidation of every country depends on a process of social self-identification. The future of a country depends on how its citizens understand their role, place, and status in the social structure. Adequacy

in this aspect defines the potential for stability in society.

The dominant feature of Russian self-identification at this time is at its lowest levels. According to Levashov (2004)¹⁵, respondents were asked about their place in society from various viewpoints such as education, profession and other parameters. They used a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the highest level of satisfaction.

The average range in education, qualification, profession was about 5.5–5.8, but the average indication of life quality was 3.8; in salary level 3.3; participation in political life 2.5 (out of 10 points). We can see an obvious gap between the level of social expectations of life based on education level, and the level of satisfaction with quality of life.

The second index is class self-identification. Thirty-one percent of respondents identified themselves as low class, 52% as middle class and 16% said it was “difficult to answer.” During the last ten years, the middle class has grown by 10%, and that makes a good base for stability in society. But It is important to note that the term “middle class” has various definitions, depending on the country. The level and life style of the Russian “middle class” might be “lower class” for Japan, for example.

The third index is the level of political consciousness. Fourteen percent said they would use guns for protection of their interests, twelve percent would take part in strikes, 16% in demonstrations. Twenty-eight percent said they would do nothing, 22% did not answer. From these results, we can see the instability in this field.

In summary, there are difficult contradictory processes of social-political self-identification in Russian society. These processes influence class structure and the future of the country. Society strives for stability in moral and professional areas, but the reality of the economic situation is still not favorable for consolidation.

One historical feature of the Russian mentality is “looking back” on previous values. Preferences of mass consciousness are different from the official points of view. According to Levashov (2004)¹⁶, the number of respondents who evaluated the activity of Stalin positively has risen. Respondents were asked what socialism and capitalism meant for them. Fifty-three percent said that socialism meant collectivism, 48% said it meant patriotism, 45% said order, and 30% noted justice. Forty-two percent said that capitalism meant criminality, 41% said it meant “no social

protection,” 33% said poverty. One third of respondents said that they would like to live under socialism, while about one quarter responded they would prefer to live under capitalism.

In conclusion, the results of these analyses of moral and social consolidations allow us to draw the following conclusions. We can find two changes in the mass consciousness of Russians. First, motivation to work has become positive; more people believe in the institution of the presidency. Second there is still a strong tendency of social and political alienation in society; people cannot believe in the army, police, courts, and mass media institutions. There is a mass consciousness of nostalgia for the Soviet period and such moral categories as collectivism, patriotism, justice, and order.

Section 3 The Economic Crisis of the 1990s and Juvenile Delinquency

In 1991, Russia was in a deep general crisis as a result of changes in the economy and the effects of inflation and speculation. All this had an effect on youth and caused deficiency in spiritual values, a decline in their interest in learning, as well as declines in work opportunities and the elementary norms of morality. The depoliticization of schools and the demise of the Komsomol (Communist youth organization) left a vacuum in moral education. The guidelines for teachers on how to bring students up were lost. Zaslavskaya, T. wrote: “Disappointment in socialism is one reason for the crumbling moral foundation. Eternal moral values such as honor, duty, morality, patriotism had been tied to socialist ideology.”¹⁷ Moreover, there was a growth of crime among young people, who had given up school and did not find work. For example, in 1991 statistics registered 2,475,762 crimes, 12% more than in the previous year. 197,000 were connected with young people.

Crime statistics, because they were not previously available and because there had been a big increase in crime owing to relaxation of the regime, became disturbing in a country which had always boasted of its low crime rates.

Problems of crime and juvenile delinquency continued to increase. More and more children were becoming disillusioned with school and the possibilities it provided for employment and making money. A new class was growing up of traders who became rich without spending

time at school or higher education. Many children were leaving school early and going on the streets to wash cars and so on. There was a desire to become rich, not in the future, but right now. Until at least 15 years ago, parents did not allow their children to work for pay, no matter what type of work it was, but with these changes, child labor has become commonplace¹⁸. The highest rate of juvenile crime was among those who had left school. In the schools, guidelines to replace the communist ideology and moral upbringing were lacking.

Homelessness became a serious problem in new Russia. One of the after-effects of the Communist Revolution and the Civil War, in the 1920-30s the numbers of homeless rose to millions. With the end of perestroika, it did not reach those proportions in the 1990s but, for example, 20,000 children were said to be homeless in St Petersburg.

The Deputy Minister of Education Mr. Asmolov presented a chart of juvenile crime in Russia, which indicated that the lowest level of crime was to be found among primary and secondary students, a higher level among vocational and technical schools and the highest among students who had dropped out of the educational system altogether (“Izvestia,” 1993)¹⁹. Another article (“Izvestia,” 1993)²⁰ gave statistics for problematic teenagers; 360,000 were registered in Russia and one-third were “street children.” About 20,000 young criminals were in labor colonies and more than 35,000 were registered with police agencies. However, the real number of potential juvenile criminals was much larger. A new category of homeless child was reported - children whose parents were alcoholics and who sold their apartments and disappeared, leaving their children with nowhere to live.

Asmolov said that Russia had to cope with the problems of socialization of the new generation of young people. They had to find new ways of training them and giving them career guidance. They had to provide a healthy and useful environment for those who wanted to continue their education after the 9th grade and they had to cope with the unemployment problems. Blankov A. head of a department of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs Research Institute, said that the “dimensions and nature of juvenile crime are a barometer of society’s moral health. And what surrounds our youngsters? Their parents have no time for them, their teachers are overworked, and the State has its

own problems...” (“Rabochaya Tribuna,” 1993)²¹. He reported that juvenile crime was growing at a rate 15 times that of adult crime.

Differences between rich and poor were escalating and the new and larger poorer classes, including workers and professionals such as teachers were not able to supply their children with goods. Young people could make up these deficiencies by selling stolen goods, becoming involved in drug trafficking, prostitution, violence and even murder. The crime rate for adults amounted to 147 criminals for every 10,000 in the population, but the rate for young people was 208 out of every 10,000. In some regions the figure was as high as 300 or 400 crimes per 10,000.

In the 21st century, a “new” problem appeared in the educational process in the new Russia. The research of Klimova S.V. (2006)²² established that the richer the student’s family was, the more positive was the teacher’s attitude toward this student. In such a situation students who lived in poor families had no chance. Education was becoming commercialized. It meant that the status of students depended on the investments of his/her family. This oriented students toward strengthening their materialistic aspect, and led poor students to crime.

According to the same research, 30.2% of young offenders (about age 16) said that their families could not eat well and buy clothes they wanted at the time they committed the crime, while 55.7% answered that they were provided only with necessities. When they committed the crimes, 57.7% were students, while 44.3% had quit school. The majority, 94.3%, said they did not work at that time, and 80.2% were appraised as bad students by teachers.

In conclusion, the minimal provision of material needs was one of the main causes of juvenile delinquency. To prevent criminal behavior in youth, effective measures to overcome poverty should be taken.

Section 4 The “Born-in-reform” Generation: their Values and Choices

The post-soviet generation is often called the “lost” generation, the “mistake of Russian history”, and so on. They hear a lot of blame placed on them: modern youth have “contempt for everyday labor;” they are anti-patriotic, thirst for profit and so on (Veselov V.P. 2003)²³. A teacher of social science Panarin A. C. wrote that the “demoralization

and disorientation of youth is unquestionable;" the "moral atmosphere gives birth to activists not of creation, but of destruction." In "Sociology of Youth" (2001)²⁴ there are such reproaches: social apathy, crisis of moral values, refusal of "pravda" (truth), love, friendship and honesty; decline in the prestige of honest labor; lies, cynicism, violence; growth of material lusts, dehumanism and so on. If we believe in such opinions, it means that there is no hope for the future of Russia.

Yet some articles express very optimistic, iridescent, sometimes idealistic opinions about youth. For example, there is an article by Zapesotskiy A.C. (2006)²⁵. In brief, some works portray youth as the image of individualists, "romantics of consumption," in others—obedient children, collectivists. So, first, let us analyze the different opinions about Russian youth and then compare them to results of our research in Kaluga City.

The majority of today's high school students in Russia were born between 1990-1992. It was a time of radical changes in the political and economic situation. The upbringing of these children was during a period of survival for their parents in a rapidly changing reality (as shown in Section 2). How did such a childhood influence their moral values and future plans? It would be interesting to explore what they think about their university education, what their relations with parents are, as well as their opinions about themselves, their future professions and some other aspects.

The first factor is the prestige of higher education for today's students. According to statistics, 85% of 10 -11th grade students are going to continue their education (2006)²⁶. Higher education has become a real life prospect for them. Statistics show growth in the social status of higher education: it has become an obligatory course for their future plans and a guarantee for successful socialization.

Lisauskene M.V. (2006)²⁷ states that the credo of present day youth include "all and right now," "score successes," and "enjoy my life." However, a good education is an important step in the process of reaching material well-being.

At the beginning of the 1990s there was a collapse of higher education; the regrowth of its prestige began in 1995. But this regrowth has led education to its mass character and has caused two main problems. The first problem is that the labor market has no demand; it means that the portion of graduating students who will not find

jobs easily is growing. The second problem is that employers are strengthening demands for higher levels of education, but universities, in order to get a profit, are increasing the commercial admission of students. That has led to a "lower quality" of graduating students.

These two tendencies define the value orientations of Russian students. According to Lisauskene M. V. (2006)²⁸, an analysis of motivations for higher education shows us that higher education is used as an instrument to reach material well-being and successful careers by youth, whom Lisauskene M.V. called "young perfectionists." In her 1995 survey, 33% of respondents answered that "higher education will give me an opportunity to find a good job"; in 2004, 66% chose this answer. Thirty-five per cent of respondents thought that "higher education is a key for a successful life" in 1995, while in 2004 this percent grew to 56%. Twenty-four percent said, "I want to make a career," in 1995; in 2004, 46% chose this answer. The instrumental functions of education are also increasing: 39% of boys said that they would like to go to university because "it will delay military service." Ten percent of respondents answered that they would like to go to university because it will mean 5 years or more of a carefree life (Table 2).

Thus, youth have become more pragmatic and use higher education as a method to reach their own aims; the terminal function of education—knowledge—is declining.

Lisauskene wrote in her article that the priorities of generation "next" looked like the "American dream": to live in the big city or go abroad, to buy luxurious cars and apartments, to run their own businesses in the financial sphere and so on. Students were asked about items of success: 48% chose "self-reliance;" 46%, "good education;" 43%, "know a lot of people;" 32%, "money;" 11%, "cunning."

Virtually all students had an orientation toward an emigration model: 40% of university students and 44% of school pupils responded, "I would like to live in any country, if life there is stable." A lot of students wanted to move from rural regions to the capital. Another characteristic of the "born-in-reform" generation is their aspiration for freedom and independence. They "do not wait for the government," they make their own destiny. Students are oriented toward a market economy; they have positive relations to business. Three fourths of youth want to open their own business; one-third think that there are no

Table 2 Motivations for receiving higher education

(%)

Why do you need higher education?	1995	2000	2004
I want to be an educated person	44	55	65
Higher education gives me an opportunity to find a good job	33	50	66
Higher education is a key for a successful life	35	48	56
I want to make a career	25	43	46
Being a student is prestigious			7
Having diploma is prestigious	17	25	
I want to change my life	11	15	
It was my parents decision	15	8	7
It will mean another 5 years or more of a carefree life		5	10
It will delay military service	2	5	10

(Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, 2006)²⁹

honest or dishonest ways to make money; one out from five wants to have money without having to do anything. Lisauskene talked about the divergence between private and public values. Nowadays youth want to work for themselves. They are ready to break rules in order to reach their own aims. Fourteen per cent said they would give up their principles to reach their own aims; 12% said they would break the law.

The next factor is relations with parents and orientation on family. According to Zapesotskiy A. C. (2006)³⁰, 64% of high school students ask their parents' advice when they choose their future profession. In contrast, statistics from the year 2003 showed, that 65% of high school students said that they would like to decide by themselves. From these results, Zapesotskiy drew the conclusion that a good model of relations to family and school has been formed lately and youth value orientations have changed, however

this point of view seems to be idealistic.

According to Semenov V. E. (2007)³¹, the main values of youth in Petersburg are family, friends and health, followed by justice, interesting job and money. Semenov noted that importance of justice has been growing lately.

We compared these results with our research conducted in Kaluga city 2007 as shown in Table 3. The difference between large cities and smaller towns is significant. For example, the tendency to select job, money, and justice was higher for youth in urban areas. However, there was virtually no difference in the results for Family, Friends and Health in either area.

Vishnevskiy Yu. R. and Shapko V. T. (2006)³² conducted surveys in three cities (Krasnaturinsk, Nizhiy Tagil, Yekaterinburg) regarding the value orientation of youth (respondents chose multiple answers from 14 items). The most frequently chosen values were Health (54-63%),

Table 3 Basic values of youth (2007)

	University %		School %	
	Petersburg	Kaluga	Petersburg	Kaluga
Family	83	88	85	94
Friends	63	52	82	68
Health	76	62	74	68
Job	41	38	54	21
Money	36	21	43	24
Justice	61	30	47	20
Religion	23	8	23	5

Family, children (43-59%), Friends (43-59%), and money, wealth, own business (48-56%). In comparison with Table 3, we can see that, while there are small differences in the percentage of respondents, Family, Friends and Health are central in the value orientation of Russian youth.

Semenov V.E.³³ stated that value orientation regarding work (labor) has undergone noticeable changes during the last 30 years. In the period 1960-1970, the desire to have an interesting job was in the 1st place, and more than two thirds of youth chose it. This was conditioned by the abolishment of ideology of social importance of job and labor upbringing during the process of reforms. The image of an honest toiler, foremost man in industry disappeared from mass media. Simply being a worker, an engineer, was no longer prestigious. The image of “Hero of labor” has changed on become an “idol of consumption,” such as pop-stars, journalists, sexologists, humorists and so on. Prestigious jobs for modern youth (Sankt-Petersburg’s statistics) are currently businessman, economist, lawyer, doctor and scientist.

The same results can be seen in smaller city Kaluga. In this survey, 28 jobs were listed and respondents were asked to evaluate them in terms of prestige and social importance (respondents selected one job for each). The top 5 jobs selected for Prestige by students in 8th-9th and 10th-11th grades were Lawyer (17-20%), Designer (8-11%), Financier (7-11%), Businessman (7-10%), and Expert in Computer Science (6-9%). The 6th most common response was Pop Star (6-8%), while the results for Scientist and Engineer

were both only 2%.

For Social Importance, the top 5 items chosen were Doctor (29-47%), Teacher (10-11%), Lower medical worker (8-10%), Lawyer (4-7%), and Military Serviceman (3-5%). Very few respondents felt that jobs such as Designer or Pop Star were socially important jobs.

The results for job evaluation according to gender were also worth notice. Jobs chosen by over 10% of both male and female students for Prestige was Lawyer (Males 15%, Females 20%), while other jobs chosen by males were Expert in Computer Science (10%, Females 6%), Businessman (10%, females 7%). In contrast, jobs chosen for Prestige for 10% or more of female respondents were Designer (14%, Males 3%), Financier (11%, Males 7%), and Lower medical worker (11%, Males 6%). For Social Importance, the largest differences in results by gender were for Doctor and Teacher. 45% of Females chose Doctor, as opposed to only 6% of male respondents, and the results for Teacher were 14% and 6% respectively. For Prestige, 5% of males and 6% of females chose Doctor, and 0% of females and 1% of males chose Teacher. While both of these jobs were seen to be socially important, extremely few respondents felt they had prestige. The main factors contributing to these results are that both are traditionally jobs held by females and both have low salaries. It can be said that this trend has changed little since the Soviet era.

It is generally believed that the value orientation and attitudes towards jobs are formed through influences such as school, home and mass media. While not directly related

Table 4 Who and what influence youth in the process of socialization? (Kaluga)

school pupils	1 st answer	2 nd answer	3 rd answer	Total
1 mother	89.0%	0.8%	0.0%	89.8%
2 father	4.3%	59.7%	0.2%	64.2%
3 friends	3.9%	19.2%	19.6%	42.7%
4 books	1.8%	9.2%	10.0%	21.1%
5 films	0.6%	2.5%	5.5%	8.6%
6 teachers	0.0%	4.9%	18.6%	23.5%
7 relatives	0.0%	2.9%	19.8%	22.7%
8 computer	0.2%	0.6%	9.0%	9.8%
9 TV	0.0%	0.2%	9.2%	9.4%
10 other	0.2%	0.0%	8.0%	8.2%

to the formation of value orientation, we would like to look at the results of two surveys measuring the effect of the home and mass media on the socialization of children.

According to research in Petersburg (2006)³⁴, youth realize who and what influences them in the process of socialization and upbringing. About 60% of respondents noticed the influence of their mother, about 45% noticed their father's influence, about 25% said "friends," about 20% - "books," 15% - "movies," and 12% - "teachers". As shown in Table 4, the results from our surveys (respondents chose 3 items) were virtually the same.

From the results of these studies, we found that the influence of television on the socialization of youth was not as great as we had expected. According to the Petersburg study, only 7% of young respondents admitted the influence of media (TV) on them, while the percentage for our survey was 9%. However, psychological experiments prove that TV affects consciousness, especially the consciousness of youth.

On TV there are many serials about bandits, vulgar shows, sexual propaganda and so on. The negative influence of all these things is obvious. Looking at this situation we remember a book title "The Ill Russia" by Merezhkovskiy D. This situation requires urgent action.

Semenov V.E. stated that youth have positive moral potential. About 80% of respondents answered that moral control over TV programs should be started. About 60% thought that modern Russian mass media does not form patriotic feelings. They noticed that mass media makes only propaganda for money, and does not strengthen values of family and justice.

We found similar results in our survey in Kaluga. For the item 'Mass media has a negative effect on youth', the combined results for 'Very true and 'Often true' was 28% for secondary school students and 50% for university students. For the item 'TV programs should be monitored for moral content', 55% of both secondary and university students felt that monitoring was necessary. For 'Television only emphasizes money propaganda', 24% of secondary students and 52% of university students agreed, and for 'Mass media undermine family values', 27% and 26% respectively agreed. These results show, the effect of mass media on the developmental process is seen differently. In comparison with Semenov V.E. the percentage of the responses was lower. In order to understand whether this is

due to the region in which the surveys were conducted, or some other factor, further research is necessary.

Sokolov A. V. conducted a survey in St-Petersburg (2005)³⁵ using an interview method for investigating students' intellectual and moral differentiation. Answering the question, "Do you like your generation?" 60% of respondents said, "Yes," 25% chose "No." For comparison, in 1961, 78% of young respondents answered "Yes" on the same question and only about 14% said "No." So, the post-soviet generation is more self-critical.

Sokolov's research shows that the youth today are aware of both the positive as well as the negative characteristics of their peers. The top 5 negative characteristics are 1) Alcoholism, drugs and other destructive health habits, 2) Egoism, envy, lack of "collectivism" and mutual aid, 3) Aggressiveness, violence, crime, 4) Boorish behavior, no respect towards adults, 5) Dishonesty, treachery. The top 5 positive characteristics are 1) Purposefulness, efficiency, 2) Independence, 3) Optimism, life activity, energy, 4) Intellectuality, creativeness, talent, 5) Altruism, humanism, kindness.

In conclusion, if we compare positive and negative features of modern youth we can see a paradox. Young people have egoism and altruism, aggressiveness and humanism and so on at the same time. Therefore, the differences of post-soviet youth from the previous generations should be taken into consideration in scientific and pedagogical activities.

We have considered one aspect of the value orientation of youth in post-Soviet Russia, but when synthesized, what can be said about the change in value orientation since the 1990s? The results of Konstantinov A.C.'s continual research on the life plans and other aspects of junior high school graduates in Arhangelsk shows that, in the last 20 years (between 1985 and 2005), there has been no significant change in the general value orientation in regards to family, health, work or friends. However, when compared to the youth of the Soviet period (1985), we find that the way that the youth interact with others and their basic morals, such as honesty, empathy, kindness and discipline, have declined. Conversely, concerns for physical appearance, manners, and the emphasis on personal relations with people closest to them have risen sharply.³⁶ The change in the value orientation of the youth since the 1980s has changed gradually, while the orientation towards

those values which are highly valued in society, such as “for the benefit of society”, “doing one’s duty for one’s country”, have changed dramatically. Sankt Petersburg’s research reveals that the orientation towards these values is only between 3 to 15 percent. Nearly half of the students in today’s society in Russia are “individualists”, and that figure rises to two thirds for students in urban areas.³⁷

The studies done by Solokov A.V. and Sherbakova I.O. (2003)³⁸ on the moral character of liberal arts students are very interesting. Through their research, they showed that students characters can be divided into 3 types: 1) Altruist (someone who pursues the goal of happiness for other people, groups, and society), 2) Egoist (someone who pursues the personal success and the fulfillment of their own desires and ambitions), 3) Conformists (someone who consciously or unconsciously accepts the traditions and norms of society and does not assert their own personal value orientation). Results showed that, while there was slight variation between departments and majors, the percentage of each type was as follows: 1) Altruist 25%, 2) Egoist 55%, 3) Conformist 20%. While these results indicate that the majority of the students were Egoists, it is also worth considering the 25% of the students who are Altruists (including nationalists).

It goes without saying that the change in value orientation can be observed not only in the youth. The change in the value orientation of adults was also dramatic. Sokolov V.M. (2004)³⁹, from the standpoint of the sociology of morals, summarizes the change in values of Russian adults in the following manner: the emphasis on values that were so important in the Soviet period, such as “the social meaning of labor”, “sense of social obligation”, and values such as “honesty” and “discipline”, has been reduced by half, while the emphasis on values such as “self-motivation”, “goal orientation”, “acquisition of material goods” has increased. In addition, he expresses his concern that due to this change in value orientation, Russian society in general has embraced pragmatism and places too much emphasis on materialism, money-worship, and the preference for personal gains.

The radical change in the social systems has led to this great change in the value orientation not only of youth, but of adults as well. However, the change was not an immediate one.

Zinoviev A. (2002)⁴⁰ emphasizes that the change in the

educational system of the post Soviet era must be understood through the following 3 sources: first, the abolishment of Communism, second, the adoption of the western system of democracy and capitalism, and third, the rejuvenation of Russian traditional spiritual culture. He suggests that the three concepts are mixed, and that these basic concepts are vital to the understanding of the change in value orientation.

It goes without saying that a person’s value orientation differs with age, occupation, gender, region, and individual lifestyle. According to Rassadina, T.A. (2006)⁴¹, the value orientation of Russians today can be divided into 3 types: 1) A westernized (americanized) individualist value orientation adjusted to the Post industrialized era (20-30%), 2) a patriotist value orientation which incorporates the traditional Russian mentality (35-40%), and 3) a mixed value orientation which combines individualism with the traditional Russian culture (30-35%). While the value orientation of Russian youth has not been typed according to this model in any known research, by comparing this data to Sokolov A. V.’s research mentioned previously, we can see that there is not a great deal of difference between adults and youth.

However, with all this said, it should be noted that this turbulent period came to an end at the end of the 1990s when the level of wages returned to the level they were at the start of the turmoil in 1990. From this turning point, a great deal of criticism focused on the value orientation and behavior of youth, and emphasis was placed on the need for greater social regulation. To conclude this paper, we would like to mention the events surrounding this period.

Section 5 The movement towards social regulation of the value orientation of Russian youth

The youth born in the post Soviet era were brought up as a generation which completely denied the values of the Soviet era and adopted Western neoliberalism and economics. School education placed emphasis on educating people who could adapt to the market economy, and who had the ability to compete in the post-industrialist, knowledge society. However, in comparison to the education of the Soviet era, the quality of education is lower in today’s Russia.⁴² After graduating from secondary school, nearly all students go on to university. In the

marketplace, there is a great number of companies requiring technicians and laborers, but there are extremely few youth who pursue these occupations. The youth who are aiming for a university education are not just expressing the basic value of success in their field of study; most are aiming for career advancement. Over 25% of university graduates do not work in an occupation related to the field in which they received their degree, and when we look at youth as a whole, we find that close to 50% of all the specialized knowledge and technical skills that youth received at school are unrelated to the work required of them in the labor market. It is said that the biggest reason for this is that university education has lost its skills training function.⁴³

One of the major concerns of the Russian education system is the health of children and youth in Russia today. By the age of 14, one third of students are living with a chronic illness, and nearly 80% of secondary school graduates are limited in their choice of occupation due to health problems, according to Fursenko A. In addition, over 40% of youth of conscription age do not meet the necessary standards for service in the military due to illness or problems with their physical development.⁴⁴ While there are many greatly entwined reasons for these health problems, the school education system cannot escape their responsibility. While there are differences according to school type, the academic burden placed on children per week is 1.5 to 2 times as heavy as it was in comparison with the Soviet era.⁴⁵ As indicated previously, health consistently holds one of the top positions of influence on the value orientation of youth. In the secondary school education system, 'Health and Lifestyle' courses are part of the curriculum, and the majority of youth understand that health forms the basis of all other activities. However, in reality, we see a great deal of activity that can be called unhealthy. Besides the traditionally prevalent alcohol and tobacco, the number of youth using illegal drugs is increasing dramatically. Even with the constant level of students experimenting with or abusing illegal substances, there is no visible movement on the part of the universities to regulate this problem.⁴⁶

What about other organizations whose function is to build character in youth? The Komsomol and Pioneer organizations which operated within the schools in the Soviet era have been abolished, and only a few examples of the latter organization now exist in a few local schools.

Nearly all of the training facilities outside of school have become commercial establishments, and cannot be used without paying a fee. In regards to education for the formation of civic spirit or patriotism, it is virtually never taught either at schools or at any other organization or institute in society. While there are many people in the older generation who feel attachment towards the values of patriotism and group-orientation, these values are out of the realm of concern for the younger generation, and there are extremely few young people who desire to acquire these values.

It goes without saying that the education of young people is a national concern. However, in regards to the problems mentioned previously, at least until the end of the 1990s, there were no measures taken to develop a youth policy or education policy. In the public education system, the focus has been placed on 'academic study' for the acquisition of knowledge or technical skills, and the problem of *vospitanie* (character education), in particular attitude formation and values formation, has been ignored.

Today's Russian society is calling for the establishment of a comprehensive character education system for children and youth. The ban on training programs in public schools in Russia was lifted with the "Russian School System Training Development Program", 1999-2001 directive of the Ministry of Education (October 18, 1999).⁴⁷ This directive, on the basis of humanism, focuses on the development of a democratic style of educational training in the school and home, and the utilization of tradition and modern-day experience to establish the conditions necessary for the development of moral and civic character and career aspirations, and the self-realization of character. It goes without saying that the directive does not aim for the reestablishment of the patriotism or collectivism which characterized the Soviet era.

Anyone can understand the importance of this character education. However, with the great variety in values characterizing Russian society today, there are many opinions and stances based on differences in the national image, social image, and personal image desired by different people, the contents and extent of this program, and the method in which it should be implemented. Unlike it was in the Soviet era, today it is difficult to develop a uniform training education system through the use of national authority.

Thus, the starting point for this training education must be in the family. For parents who used to have the authoritarian household of the past, this new training education would not be easy. The method suggested by the state is individualism based in humanism. Parents must respect their children character, and children will be expected to raise their academic standing as well as giving high self-evaluations. The Russian family of today, unlike that of the past, is experiencing strong pressure due to these new values and norms expected by the state.⁴⁸

For teachers who are no longer accustomed to it, this training education will not be easy. In the current conditions, where individualism training education which respects each child is not the norm, a movement has begun to utilize the traditional Kollektiv (group) to manage classes. In addition, there has been a rejuvenation of Makarenko A.S. pedagogy and its practice, which places emphasis on the value of training education for production labor for children, and through these activities, develop true self-independence, respect for others, a love for work and a spirit of patriotism. Since 2002, in schools in certain local areas and agricultural communities, the 'Makarenko International Competition' Movement has been started, which synthesizes production labor and education. However, at this point, there is no approval from the state at this time.

When considering the unification of Russia today, it is impossible to emphasize only the particularities of general human values or the national ethos, say Gavriluk V.V. and Malenkov V. V.; we must also look at an ideology that is suitable for a new Russia. They state that the ethos of competitive ability which the nation presents has taken on an instrumental characteristic, and is certainly not one that will be accepted as a major Russian ethic by society. Instead, they say that the ethics that will form the basis of the new Russian ideology are civic spirit (*grazdanstvennost*) and patriotism.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, there is not a coherent consensus as to the content or the method for achieving this new Russian ethic. As noted previously, this is simply one of the many concepts of the Ministry of Education.

Since the disappointment with neoliberalism as future perspective, there are many influences which try to take its place in their own manner as a method of training education for civic spirit and patriotism. Gavriluk and Malenkov's research shows that there is an orientation towards the civic

spirit model formed in the roots of Soviet history era which is predominant.⁵⁰ However, while the orientation towards this model readily assimilates the experiences of the Soviet era, it does not indicate a return to the ethics of the that time.

It goes without saying that the return to training education will be an effective method for correcting the problems with the behavior and value orientation of Russian youth. But the principles and methods of training education based on these principles are caught in the violent turmoil between reform and tradition.

Conclusion

The main goal of this paper was to consider the change in the value orientation of Russian youth in the post-Soviet era using research data from both national level Russian sociologists and local data, and to evaluate the manner in which solutions to the problems are being suggested. While there is a limitation to the time-orientation of the data concerning the change in value orientation in youth, it can be said that we have accomplished our goal. Finally, we will summarize our results and discuss future possibilities for research.

In the rapid conversion of the social system from communism to capitalism, the morals and values of not only adults, but also Russian youth, were thrown into great confusion, and the value orientation and lifestyles of these youth underwent dramatic change. In short, it was a change from living as collectivists to living as individualist with a stance in neoliberalist thought. In Russian society, being an individualist is regarded to be the same as being an egoist, a person with a lack of civil spirit and concern for others and the value of work for society, and thus is seen in low regard. In the discussion of the lifestyles and value orientation of Russian youth, their focus on attaining material wealth should be particularly noted. While the universal human values of family, friends and health did not change significantly when compared with the Soviet era, the instrumental value of acquiring material wealth was virtually nonexistent in the youth of Russian society, but has now led to the worship of money, capitalism and the rapid rise in crime and other illegal profit schemes.

The value orientation and behavior of Russian youth, whether adaptive or maladaptive, is not particularly

different than that of the youth of Japan or other capitalist countries of the West. However, a large portion of Russian society critically views the social and economic policies of neoliberalism. They are also reexamining educational policies which previously focused mainly on the acquisition of knowledge, and are calling for the strengthening of methods of upbringing regarding the fostering of value orientation and character-building. But it is not just the value orientation and behavioral patterns of the youth that cause so many of the citizens of Russia to furrow their brows; the fluctuation of the national identity of the older generations is also in the background and is heavily entwined. Although long overdue, the Russian Ministry of Education reopened the educational system to incorporate methods in values and behavioral education, and issued a directive on the methods and contents of this form of education in the late 1990s. However, as we mentioned previously, the value orientation model of Russian citizens is greatly varied, and there is not a comprehensive view as to the contents, scope or methods of this education to apply. As in the past, the directives put forth by the Ministry of Education do not carry a great deal of weight, thus, while it is not necessary to return to the past, many people are in favor of following the contents, methods and directions of the Soviet period. The strengthening of moral education should have an important influence on bringing forth a change in the value orientation of Russian youth, and it will be worth paying attention to the methods, content and manner in which this education is strengthened in the future.

Finally, in regards to future research, we would like to touch on two trends in education which have the potential to influence the value orientation of youth. One, which we have mentioned in this paper, is the rejuvenation of Makarenko educational pedagogy in the field of school education which incorporates the strengthening of moral education. Currently, pedagogy of Makarenko is being received with mixed results, but is favored by educators who are having problems with classroom management and moral education as well as parents anxious about the difference in values of their children, and we foresee further acceptance of this technique in the future. Most notable is the gap between neo-liberal individual education and the collectivist education and productive labor education which are central to Makarenko's moral education theory. Will the

two reach a balance, and how will the Makarenko theory and methods adjust to the globalized market economy? In addition, will collectivist education for youth cultivate civic spirit and a change in value orientation towards work? These are all interesting issues which deserve further attention.

Second trend is the concern regarding the value orientation in students of secondary education. In today's society, almost all youth graduate from secondary school and most would like to go on to get a higher education. However, there is a major obstacle to this advancement-the current drive to institute fees for university education. In 1997, only 8.8% of university entrants were charged, but this figure had risen to 56% by 2004.⁵¹ Many of the specialized courses in secondary education have also instituted fees, and the advancement to university is now heavily influenced by the financial muscle of parents. How will this affect the formation process of the value orientation of youth? There is a new need to consider these issues from the aspect of class and education, which we must consider in the future.

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* The survey was conducted in September 2007 at 6 schools in Kaluga City and the Kaluga region and at Kaluga State Pedagogical University in Russia. The number of survey distribution is 1262:5-6 grades -280,8-9 grades-229,10-11 grades-260 and university-493 students. The return rate is 100% in all classes.

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